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THE AGE OF FORGOTTEN INNOCENCE:
THE DANGERS OF APPLYING ANALOG
RESTRICTIONS TO INNOCENT INFRINGEMENT
IN THE DIGITAL ERA
Brian Sheridan*
Recently, two popular topics of discussion within intellectual property
law have been the statutory damage regime and the legality of peer-to-peer
(P2P) downloading. This Note examines a rarely discussed interplay
between these two concepts: the innocent infringement defense. Innocent
infringement allows a court to dramatically reduce the minimum statutory
damage award for an act of copyright infringement from $750 to $200 per
act. Both the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have found that § 402(d) of the
Copyright Act eliminates innocent infringement as a matter of law in a P2P
download setting.
This Note examines those circuits’ reasoning as well as the various
responses from the legal academic community. It argues against those
circuits’ interpretation of the phrase “access to published phonorecords,”
found in § 402(d), to mean a general availability and a duty to inquire as to
the copyright status of the songs in question. By viewing § 402(d) in this
light, those courts have effectively eliminated the defense when applied to
P2P downloading. This Note advocates for an actual inquiry into a
defendant’s state of mind to determine if they had “reason to believe” their
actions constituted infringement, which would preserve innocent
infringement in a digital environment.
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INTRODUCTION
Compare two scenes. In the first, a teenage girl comes home from
school, goes on her computer, and downloads a handful of songs through a
peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing network. 1 The other takes place in New
York City’s Chinatown in the late 1980s. Gift shops and flea markets are
cashing in on the buzz surrounding the film Batman 2 and making a fortune
selling anything they can bearing that infamous bat symbol. 3
Without analyzing the relative legal standards, which of these two
copyright infringers would you say deserved to claim their innocence—and
essentially their ignorance of the copyright violation—to reduce their
liability in damages? This Note explores the rationale courts have
employed in granting innocent infringer mitigation in the commercial
context 4 but not in the digital download scenario 5 in which defendants
claim a similar “[l]ack of legal sophistication.”6

1. See Maverick Recording Co. v. Harper, 598 F.3d 193, 194–95 (5th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 590 (2010).
2. BATMAN (Warner Brothers 1989).
3. See, e.g., D.C. Comics Inc. v. Mini Gift Shop, 912 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1990).
4. See id. at 37.
5. See Harper, 598 F.3d at 199; BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir.
2005).
6. Harper, 598 F.3d at 199; see also D.C. Comics, 912 F.2d at 35 (noting the level of
sophistication of the defendants).
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Innocent infringement is a component of copyright law’s statutory
damages scheme. 7 A court may mitigate a damage award to no lower than
$200 if it finds that the infringer “was not aware and had no reason to
believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright.” 8 This
defense is therefore pertinent to downloading pirated music because
defendants often infringe on multiple songs, which increases their total
statutory damage penalty. 9
Both the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have relied on § 402(d) of the
Copyright Act in denying innocent infringement mitigation in a P2P
downloading scenario. 10 This section bars mitigation if the infringer had
“access” to a published “phonorecord” marked with the appropriate
copyright notice. 11 This Note argues that those circuits’ interpretation of
the word “access,” in the context of digital downloading, is problematic for
a variety of reasons.
First, it steps away from the original legislative intent for a general
protection of innocent infringers. 12 Second, by not inquiring as to whether
the defendant actually had “access” to the published records, those courts
have ignored the differences between the modern world and the analog
world in which those provisions were written. 13 Lastly, given the typical
infringer’s claims of naïveté and innocence, 14 the commonality of P2P
downloading as a new social “norm” justifies the defense’s application or,
at the very least, its consideration. 15 Furthermore, this Note is timely
because the applicability of the innocent infringer defense to P2P is the next
logical step in a litigation strategy dating back to A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc. 16
Part I of this Note examines the development and legislative history of
innocent infringement in American copyright law. Part II discusses P2P
downloading as a backdrop for copyright infringement, the difficulties it
presents, and the Recording Industry Association of America’s (RIAA)
7. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006); Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory
Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439,
452–53 (2009) (examining the statutory damages provision for copyright infringement and
noting that the innocent infringer provision was an attempt by Congress to limit statutory
damages).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
9. See, e.g., Harper, 598 F.3d at 194–95 (noting that computer forensic evidence
originally discovered 544 audio files, which were subsequently deleted, and then an
additional cache of 700 files; plaintiffs, however, only sought recovery on thirty-seven audio
files); Gonzalez, 430 F.3d at 889–90 (explaining that originally 1,370 copyrighted files were
found but, due to a dispute over which songs the defendant had purchased on CDs before the
downloads and which she bought after, the action only focused on thirty undisputed
infringing acts).
10. See infra notes 188–92, 211–15 and accompanying text.
11. 17 U.S.C. § 402(d).
12. See infra Part I.
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See infra notes 179, 196–205 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 124–33 and accompanying text.
16. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding Napster guilty of contributory infringement);
see infra Part II.B.
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litigation strategy against both direct and indirect infringers. Part III
analyzes the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ denial of the innocent infringer
defense in a P2P setting—citing § 402(d)—as well as various critiques of
those opinions. Lastly, Part IV argues against those circuits’ reasoning and
for a more practical interpretation of “access” that will account for both the
realities of the digital age and the legislative intent behind § 402(d).
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INNOCENT INFRINGEMENT
This part examines the history of innocent infringement in American
copyright law. First, it explores the period from America’s first copyright
statute in 1790 until its initial overhaul in 1909, which was characterized by
a high level of protection for innocent infringers. It then analyzes the
period from 1909 onward, highlighted by the 1976 revisions that contain
the modern statutory damage and innocent infringement provisions. Lastly,
it introduces a Second Circuit decision as an example of innocent
infringement mitigation.
A. The Roots of Innocent Infringement
Like most of the American legal system, copyright law traces its roots to
England. Passed in 1709, the Statute of Anne17 was the first British
copyright legislation. 18 Written for the “Encouragement of learned Men to
compose and write useful Books,” the Statute of Anne imposed a penalty of
one penny per sheet of copyrighted material found in an infringer’s
possession. 19 Thus, the first Anglo-American copyright law operated under
a statutory damage system, rather than requiring the copyright holder to
prove actual or punitive damages. 20
Warning that “many Persons may through Ignorance offend this Act,” the
statute contained an express concern for innocent infringers.21 A
registration system was designed whereby liability would not attach to
those who printed their own copies of a protected work “unless the Title to
the Copy of such Book or Books hereafter published [was] . . . entred [sic]
in the Register Book of the Company of Stationers.” 22 The hope was that
such a system would lower the risk of innocent infringement by logging
every copyrighted work into a central record.23
17. 8 Ann., c. 21 (1709) (Eng.).
18. See R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law: A History, 30
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 133, 136 (2007) (discussing the 1790 Copyright Act’s similarities to the
Statute of Anne).
19. Statute of Anne § 1.
20. See id.; 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 14.01–.04 (2009) (discussing the differences between actual, punitive, and statutory
damages for an act of copyright infringement).
21. Statute of Anne § 2; see Reese, supra note 18, at 145–46 (discussing the Statute of
Anne’s concern with innocent infringement and the development of the registration system
as a means of protection against such a risk).
22. Statute of Anne § 2.
23. See Reese, supra note 18, at 146 (“Having seen the risk of innocent offense, the
drafters attempted to reduce this risk through a registration system.”).
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With regard to the sale of infringing works, the statute applied only to
those individuals who “knowing the same to be so printed or
reprinted . . . sell publish or expose to Sale” any book. 24 While the act
essentially imputed constructive knowledge of the registry on printers, the
above provision demonstrates that early British lawmakers were concerned
with innocent infringement, specifically the unknowing sale of infringing
merchandise.
America did not establish a federal copyright law until 1790.25
Previously, copyright enforcement occurred at the state level, except in
Delaware, which had no copyright statute. 26 Similar to the Statute of Anne,
the 1790 Act allowed for statutory damages at a rate of fifty cents per sheet
for any copyrighted material found in an infringer’s possession. 27
Knowledge was a crucial element of early American copyright
infringement. 28 The 1790 Act imposed liability only on those individuals
who
shall print, reprint, publish, or import . . . any copy or copies of such map,
chart, book or books, without the consent of the author or proprietor
thereof . . . ; or knowing the same to be so printed, reprinted, or imported,
shall publish, sell, or expose to sale . . . any copy of such map, chart, book
or books, without such consent . . . . 29

Thus, the law provided the same distinction as the Statute of Anne between
printing an infringing copy and selling such a copy. The inclusion of a
knowledge requirement appears to be a purposeful safeguard for innocent
infringers, as the 1790 Patent Act imposed liability even on unknowing
infringers. 30 As copyright law slowly grew to protect more types of works,
Congress “took care to preserve the distinction between types of
infringement and to require knowledge on the part of a seller of
Although the knowledge requirement was
unauthorized copies.” 31
ultimately abandoned in 1909, 32 the retention of this mens rea element of

24. Statute of Anne § 1.
25. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831); see Stephanie Berg,
Remedying the Statutory Damages Remedy for Secondary Copyright Infringement Liability:
Balancing Copyright and Innovation in the Digital Age, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 265,
274–75 (2009) (discussing the circumstances surrounding Congress’s adoption of the
original federal copyright act).
26. See, e.g., Matt Jackson, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: An Historical Analysis
of Copyright Liability, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 367, 378 (2002) (further noting that
among these twelve, four states did not distinguish innocent from willful infringement).
27. Act of May 31, 1790 § 2, 1 Stat. at 124–25.
28. Reese, supra note 18, at 178–79 (stating that the 1909 Copyright Act “abandoned the
basic structure of all prior U.S. copyright law that required knowing action for certain acts to
constitute infringement”).
29. Act of May 31, 1790 § 2, 1 Stat. at 124–25.
30. The text of the 1790 Patent Act made no reference to any knowledge on the part of
the infringer, but rather imposed liability on any person who “shall devise, make, construct,
use, employ, or vend” any patented product within the United States. 1790 Patent Act, ch. 7,
§ 4, 1 Stat. 109, 111.
31. Reese, supra note 18, at 156.
32. See infra Part I.B.2.
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copyright infringement for over 100 years demonstrates a deep-seated
concern for innocent infringement.
Another similarity with the Statute of Anne came in the form of a
registration component. 33 The 1790 Act system mandated that all
copyrighted works be recorded in the clerk’s office of the district court in
which the author resided. 34 In 1802, Congress mandated that protection
would only be granted to those holders who placed “the copy of the record,
which, by said act he is required to publish in one or more of the
newspapers, to be inserted at full length in the title-page or in the page
immediately following the title of every such book or books.” 35 This notice
provision reduced the risks of innocent infringement more so than the
previous incarnation of the Act, given its convenience over checking each
district court’s records. 36 This would prove to be the nineteenth century’s
most substantive change to the copyright law with respect to innocent
infringement. 37
In 1909, the law experienced a comprehensive overhaul, becoming broad
enough to cover a variety of works and recognizing the growing landscape
of copyright protection. 38 An examination of the legislative history behind
the 1909 Act provides an interesting picture into the drafters’ views on
innocent infringement. 39
B. Copyright Law Developments in the Twentieth Century
1. The Legislative History of the Copyright Act of 1909
In response to the Senate Committee on Patents’ desire to overhaul the
copyright regime, the Librarian of Congress called a conference in 1905.40
A survey of the debates demonstrates that innocent infringement was a
legitimate concern of the time.

33. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
34. See Act of May 31, 1790 § 3, 1 Stat. at 125.
35. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 1, 2 Stat. 171, 171 (repealed 1831).
36. See Reese, supra note 18, at 151–52. The notice requirement ensured that “none
could offend ignorantly. [Publication of notice in a newspaper] was mere legal implied
notice; [publication of notice on every printed copy of a work] was a notice in fact, which no
man could either overlook or mistake.” Id. (citing Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591,
698 (1834) (Baldwin, J., dissenting)).
37. See Reese, supra note 18, at 150–51 (discussing the origins of the notice requirement
and its effect of “obviously provid[ing] significantly greater protection for possible
unknowing infringers than did the formalities of the original 1790 Act or the Statute of
Anne”).
38. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 5, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076, repealed by Copyright Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541; see Reese, supra note 18, at 175 (noting that the
landscape the 1909 copyright system operated in was “radically different[]” than at the time
of the 1790 Act).
39. Jackson, supra note 26, at 379–84. See generally 1–2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
1909 COPYRIGHT ACT (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1976) [hereinafter
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
40. See 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 39, pt. C, at vii.
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As the conference began, lawmakers categorized infringers into certain
groups based on their relevant intent. 41 Among these, they distinguished
between “the mere pirate” who “would not be [represented at] . . . your
hearings” and “the innocent reproducer [who would not be] unrepresented
at the conferences or in the discussions.” 42 With innocent infringers noted
as a group deserving consideration, the debates proceeded. 43
Notes from the debates evidence a general concern over knowing versus
innocent violations. The comments of Robert Underwood Johnson,
Secretary of the American (Authors’) Copyright League, are especially
telling of this sentiment:
I hope in the new draft [of the Copyright Act] there will be, as far as
possible, a careful discrimination between malicious infringement and
innocent infringement. Those who innocently infringe a copyright are
exposed to enormous penalties under the present draft. These penalties
ought not to be imposed for innocent infringement. 44

Much of the discussion concerning innocent infringement was, as it is
today, 45 tied to the notice requirement. 46 The final draft of the 1909 Act
contained a provision stating that the lack of notice, while not voiding
protection for the holder altogether, would “prevent the recovery of
damages against an innocent infringer who has been misled by the omission
of the notice.” 47 While innocent infringement remained a powerful
protection, this change constrained it to instances in which a copy without
the proper notice had misled the infringer and only provided the violator
with relief from damages.
41. See Berg, supra note 25, at 278–79.
42. 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 39, pt. H, at 17 (demonstrating intent to include
the views of the latter).
43. See id.
44. 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 39, pt. D, at 258 (demonstrating that excessive
damage awards against innocent infringers were a concern at the time of drafting). The
converse of the innocent infringer provision is the knowing/willful infringement provision.
The current version was enacted in 1976 and states that when “the copyright owner sustains
the burden of proving, and the court finds, that the infringement was committed willfully, the
court in its discretion may increase the award . . . to a sum of not more than $150,000.” 17
U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006); see Berg, supra note 25, at 299–300 (discussing the original
enactment of the 1976 statutory damage provisions). It is also important to note that the
burden of proof for willful infringement is on the holder of the copyright, while the burden
of proof for innocent infringement is on the infringer. See § 504(c)(2).
45. See infra notes 189–94 and accompanying text.
46. The rationale behind § 20 of the 1909 Act appears, at a glance, to be extremely
relevant to the controversy over music downloads where copyright notice is affixed to
physical CDs, but never to the digital music file themselves. This is further evidenced by
remarks concerning the clause at the 1909 debates:
The last paragraph [which would become § 20] has been to some extent already
discussed. The failure, owing to accident or mistake, to give the prescribed notice
on a particular copy or copies does not, under the provisions of this bill, invalidate
the copyright, but it does provide that if anyone is misled by the failure to give the
notice in a copy and innocently infringes, there shall be no recovery of damages
against such infringer for what he innocently did . . . .
6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 39, pt. N, at 13.
47. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 20, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080, repealed by Copyright Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
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Thus, the debates leading up to the 1909 Copyright Act demonstrate a
respect for, and intention to protect the rights of, innocent infringers. 48
2. The 1909 Provisions: Abandonment of the Knowledge Requirement
and Effect of Relief Provisions
Of all the new components of the Copyright Act of 1909, the omission of
the knowledge requirement appears to be the most relevant to the innocent
infringement discussion. 49 The Act operated by enumerating certain
exclusive rights owed to a copyright holder, 50 but “never expressly defined
infringement and articulated no knowledge or mental-state requirement for
any violations.” 51 Pursuant to this structure, courts have generally refrained
from inquiring into a defendant’s state of mind in their determinations of
infringement since the 1909 Act. 52
With the knowledge requirement extinguished, the only protection for
innocent infringers was a limitation on the copyright holder’s recovery. 53
However, the Act did provide that “in a suit for infringement no permanent
injunction shall be had unless the copyright proprietor shall reimburse to the
innocent infringer his reasonable outlay innocently incurred if the court, in
its discretion, shall so direct.” 54 Reimbursing innocent infringers for their
own labor added a level of protection for those who may have invested
substantially in their reproductions of a copyrighted work. 55 Nevertheless,
the statute did not excuse the infringer of liability for profits from the
reproductions. 56
The years between the 1909 Act and the next major overhaul in 1976
were marked by two additional protections for innocent infringers. When
Congress extended copyright protection to motion pictures in 1912, it
provided that statutory damages made “in lieu of actual damages” would be
48. Due to the practicalities of technology of that time, this was a concern with
commercial reproductions, as infringement on a small scale or personal level was
impractical. See infra Part II.A. The remarks of W.A. Livingstone, President, Print
Publishers’ Association of America, at the Conference are especially telling: “I wish to
point out further that there is no way in which you can frame that provision regarding the
notice, so that you will prevent all cases of innocent infringement . . . . We cannot excape
[sic] some of these troubles.” 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 40, pt. E, at 291.
49. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
50. Section 1 of the Act lists the rights of a copyright holder, while § 5 lists the types of
works covered under the Act. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909 §§ 1, 5, 35 Stat. at 1075–77.
51. Reese, supra note 18, at 179; see Jackson, supra note 26, at 381–82 (discussing the
general strict liability structure used in the 1909 Act).
52. Courts do, however, inquire into a defendant’s mental state when determining the
good faith standards of the “fair use” defense. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
54. Act of Mar. 4, 1909 § 20, 35 Stat. at 1080.
55. See Reese, supra note 18, at 180 (noting the protective nature, but also warning that
the “requirement for reimbursement by the copyright owner was left to the discretion of the
court”).
56. See ARTHUR W. WEIL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW: WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO
THE PRESENT UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT ACT 354 (1917) (noting that, under the 1909
statutory scheme, the “profits made by an innocent infringer may be recovered,” which was
“required by the language of the Act and to be sound, from a technical point of view”).
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limited to $100 when the infringer “was not aware that he was infringing,
and that such infringement could not have been reasonably foreseen.” 57 In
1952, Congress provided an innocent infringer exception for broadcasters
who infringed on non-dramatic literary works—which were granted
protection in the same amendment—when it could be shown that the
broadcaster was not aware that they were infringing. 58
3. The 1976 Act: Start of the Modern Scheme
With hopes of modernizing the copyright system, the statute was
amended again in 1976. 59 The Copyright Office of the Library of Congress
began a series of studies on the current state of the law in 1955 that resulted
in the 1976 revision. 60 When discussions began, a major topic was the
notice requirement, which Congress had begun to “liberalize” in 1909. 61
Notice had originally been one of the chief protections for innocent
infringers, 62 and that practical benefit was still apparent at the time of the
1976 Act. The House Reports on the 1976 Act demonstrate the importance
that the notice requirement had for the innocent infringer, stating that the:
general postulates underlying the provision are that a person acting in
good faith and with no reason to think otherwise should ordinarily be able
to assume that a work is in the public domain if there is no notice on an
authorized copy or phonorecord and that, if he relies on this assumption,
he should be shielded from unreasonable liability. 63

The 1976 Act ultimately retained the notice requirement, although it
further relaxed its terms. 64 It also retained the clause protecting those who
were misled by an omission of notice, providing for “no liability for actual
or statutory damages.” 65

57. Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, § 25(b), 37 Stat. 488, 489 (repealed 1976); see
Jackson, supra note 26, at 383 (discussing the 1912 and 1952 innocent infringer amendments
and noting that the justification for the filmmaker provision was possibly due to the
“frequency of exhibition”).
58. Act of July 17, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-575, 66 Stat. 752 (repealed 1976). The concept
of affording special protection to public broadcasters was something that was retained in the
1976 revision. See infra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.
59. See Berg, supra note 25, at 300; see also Jackson, supra note 57, at 383–90
(surveying the early history surrounding the 1976 revisions and noting that innocent
infringement was a concern from the revisions’ start in 1955).
60. See, e.g., WILLIAM S. STRAUSS, STUDY NO. 22: THE DAMAGE PROVISIONS OF THE
COPYRIGHT LAW (Oct. 1956), reprinted in 2 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY ix–32 (George S. Grossman ed., 2001).
61. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
63. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 148 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5764.
64. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, §§ 405, 406, 90 Stat. 2541, 2578–79
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 405, 406 (2006)); see also Reese, supra note 18, at 176–77
(discussing the relaxation of the notice requirement, in terms of form, placement, and errors,
and its subsequent effect on innocent infringement).
65. In terms of injunctive relief, the Act also authorized a court to allow the infringer to
continue after the infringer had paid a reasonable license fee to the holder of the copyright.
Copyright Act of 1976 § 405(b).
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The notice provision was completely eliminated in 1988 when the United
States joined the Berne Convention, 66 but Congress sought to retain an
incentive for holders to still attach notice to their works, by enacting
§ 402(d). 67 This new section provided that “[i]f a notice of copyright . . .
appears on the published phonorecord . . . to which a defendant in a
copyright infringement suit had access, then no weight shall be given to
such a defendant’s interposition of a defense based on innocent
infringement in mitigation of actual or statutory damages.” 68 In light of the
fact that copyright holders today enjoy a larger bundle of rights than in
previous incarnations of the regime, the abandonment of the notice
requirement proved to be a major blow to innocent infringer protection.69
The 1976 Act also introduced the modern statutory damage system,
which includes the innocent infringement clause.70 Innocent infringement
applies when an infringer “was not aware and had no reason to believe that
his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright,” and allows a court
to reduce the award of statutory damages to $200 per act. 71 At the debates
on the proposed amendments, representatives of the broadcasting and
educational industries had argued that damages should be completely set
aside in cases of “genuinely innocent infringement” unless actual damage
could be shown. 72 Section 504(c)(2) was meant to be a compromise
between those two groups and others who advocated for stronger penalties
for innocent infringers. 73 The Act’s drafters originally understood this
provision as “sufficient [enough] to protect against unwarranted liability in
cases of occasional or isolated innocent infringement.” 74 Congress

66. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, §7, 102
Stat. 2853, 2857–59 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) The Berne
Convention was an international agreement primarily designed to provide reciprocal
recognition of signatory countries’ copyright structures.
67. See 17 U.S.C. § 402(d); 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 20, § 7.02(C)(3) (stating
that while “notice [was] no longer required at publication . . . [an] incentive for use of the
same type of copyright notice” was created in § 402(d)).
68. § 402(d).
69. See Reese, supra note 18, at 178 (“The early constructive notice approach to
enabling users to avoid infringing depended on a relatively clear demarcation between a
copyright owner’s exclusive rights and uses of a work that did not infringe. Today, thoughs
[sic] most noninfringing uses of copyrighted works are those allowed under significantly
indeterminate doctrines . . . [one] who wants to use a work without infringing must
determine not only whether the work is copyright but, more importantly, whether the use is
permissible.”).
70. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
71. Id. § 504(c)(2).
72. See CAMBRIDGE RESEARCH INST., OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION: COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES 145 (1973); Berg, supra note 25, at 298–99 (discussing the
concerns about innocent infringement, as well as those about new technologies, at the
debates).
73. See CAMBRIDGE RESEARCH INST., supra note 72, at 145; Jackson, supra note 26, at
384–86 (summarizing both sides’ arguments in the original innocent infringer debate).
74. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 163 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5779;
see also Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 7, at 460 (discussing the tripartite system of
statutory damages in general, namely standard, innocent, and willful infringement).
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ultimately sided with broadcasters and educators, however; the latter
portion of § 504(c)(2) provides:
[t]he court shall remit statutory damages in any case where an infringer
believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of
the copyrighted work was a fair use under section 107, if the infringer
was: (i) an employee or agent of a nonprofit educational institution . . . or
(ii) a public broadcasting entity. . . . 75

The retention of a damage floor generally—as opposed to the specific
remittance of damages afforded innocent educators and broadcasters—was
intended to preserve a deterrent effect, as it would not allow an infringer to
escape liability simply because the holder could not disprove a claim of
innocence. 76
In contrast to the notice requirement, the statutory damages innocent
infringement provision has largely remained untouched since its
inception. 77 While the statutory minimum for innocent infringement
increased from $100 to $200 with the adoption of the Berne Convention,78
it has otherwise remained consistent despite subsequent changes to the
copyright law to reflect the growing digital environment. 79
C. A Modern Example of Innocent Infringement in the Courts
An analysis of the Second Circuit’s opinion in D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Mini
Gift Shop 80 provides a typical example of innocent infringement mitigation
of a statutory damage award. 81 The infringers there were a number of
recent immigrants who maintained several shops in and around New York
City. 82 At these establishments, the defendants sold various pieces of
merchandise that infringed on the Batman license.83 The time of the
infringement coincided with the release of Tim Burton’s film of the same
name. 84 The plaintiff, Warner Brothers, Inc., owned the Batman mark and
various licenses through its subsidiaries. 85 Throughout the course of
litigation, plaintiffs elected to receive statutory damages under § 504 (c)(1)
75. § 504(c)(2).
76. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 163, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5779.
77. The lack of change in terms of statutory damages stands in contrast with the
technological world, which has been radically altered since the time of the 1976 Act. See
infra Part II.A.
78. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
79. Compare § 504 (current version), with Copyright Act of 1976 § 504, Pub. L. No. 94533, 90 Stat. 2541, 2585–86 (original). The Digital Millennium Copyright Act was the
largest revision of copyright law since the 1976 Act, but made no modifications to the
innocent infringement protections found in 17 USC § 504(c)(2). See Pub. L. No. 105-304,
§1, 112 Stat. 2860; DAVID NIMMER, COPYRIGHT: SACRED TEXT, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE
DMCA 385 (2003).
80. 912 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1990).
81. See id. at 36.
82. Id. at 31–32.
83. Id. at 31.
84. Id.; see also BATMAN, supra note 2.
85. D.C. Comics, 912 F.2d at 31.
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of the Copyright Act and the defendants sought mitigation via
§ 504(c)(2). 86
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted
mitigation to both those defendants who had appeared at trial and those who
defaulted. 87 Plaintiffs appealed the judgment, claiming that granting
reduced statutory damages was improper for both sets of defendants.88 The
Second Circuit held that the district court’s extension of the innocent
infringer defense to the defaulting defendants was unwarranted because the
burden of proof rests on a defendant, and therefore increased their damage
penalty to the contemporary minimum of $500 per act. 89
It was the Second Circuit’s discussion of the appearing defendants,
however, that is significant to the innocent infringement debate. The court
began by noting that the goods themselves carried no copyright notice and
were, to a layperson, virtually indistinguishable from non-infringing
merchandise. 90 The simple absence of the appropriate notice, however, is
not enough to establish innocent infringement if the defendant had “reason
to believe” the merchandise was copyrighted.91
Judge Roger J. Miner adopted the paradigmatic understanding of
§ 504(c)(2) that an “inquiry into the defendant’s state of mind” is crucial
Relying on transcripts from trial
when considering mitigation.92
appearances that clearly demonstrated the defendants’ lack of business
sophistication, the court determined that a defendant’s inexperience was “an
entirely proper means of determining whether or not his infringement was
innocent.” 93 Such a lack of sophistication added weight to the fact that there
was no copyright notice on the infringing goods and, therefore, the Second
Circuit held that the defendants deserved damage mitigation as innocent
infringers. 94 Moreover, the shop owner’s lack of sophistication and the
appearance of the goods provided justification for their failure to “inquire as
86. Id. at 35 (discussing a number of defendants in this litigation who failed to appear
before the district court).
87. Id. at 31.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 35 (stating that the court simply “could not make any finding of innocence
concerning the defendants who failed to appear”).
90. Id. (“[T]here were no copyright notices on the infringing goods and . . . a layman
would not be able to distinguish between licensed and unlicensed goods . . . . This evidence
tends to establish that defendants’ infringement was innocent.”). In this regard, the goods in
question were similar to a song downloaded through a P2P network. See infra note 297 and
accompanying text.
91. D.C. Comics, 912 F.2d at 35.
92. Id. at 35. Furthermore, it is important to note that the “defense” of innocent
infringement never absolves liability but merely reduces an award for statutory damages. See
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2)(2006).
93. D.C. Comics, 912 F.2d at 35–36 (remarking that the defendants “lacked ‘the
sophistication or level of understanding’ to prompt an inquiry into the source of the
unmarked goods”). Generally, experience can give rise to a duty of inquiry. See Little Mole
Music v. Spike Inv., Inc., 720 F. Supp. 751, 755 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (holding that the
defendant, an experienced jukebox operation, “should” have inquired into the copyrighted
nature of the copyrighted music).
94. D.C. Comics, 912 F.2d at 36.
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to the source of the goods,” which may have uncovered their copyrighted
nature. 95 The shop owners were ultimately deemed innocent infringers and
their judgment against them was mitigated to $200 per act.96
This application of the innocent infringement provision, as well as
statutory damage system in general, has remained nearly untouched since
its inception in 1976, 97 but the landscape in which copyright infringement
may take place has experienced an extraordinary transformation.
II. THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION: THE EFFECT OF P2P DOWNLOADING
ON COPYRIGHT LAW AND PERSONAL USE
This part focuses on the history of P2P downloading. It begins by
examining the radically different landscape in which copyright infringement
now exists: the digital arena. It then analyzes the RIAA’s 98 litigation
strategy against P2P services that were used for illegal downloading
(indirect infringers). Lastly, this part presents the circumstances that
ultimately led the RIAA to bring claims against individuals who had
downloaded music files from P2P networks (end-users).
A. Comparison to Infringement in the Analog World
It has been suggested that copyright infringement in the digital era
presents several “distinct problems” when applied to the current, pre-digital
statutory regime. 99 This is of no surprise, as copyright law developed
around large scale “means for mechanically capturing and reproducing
works of authorship . . . and new devices and methods for distributing,
receiving, and perceiving [such] content.”100 Such a system contrasts
sharply with the infringement examined in this Note, which is limited to
digital downloading, mainly from P2P networks.

95. Id.; see also Dolori Fabrics, Inc. v. Limited, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1347, 1354 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (finding that a dress supplier’s failure to undertake a copyright search was not enough
to find her infringement intentional because she had no notice that the pattern was
trademarked and had not dealt with the plaintiff prior to the suit). It is important to note that
this conclusion that there was no duty to inquire is the exact opposite of that in BMG Music
v. Gonzalez where the defendant similarly lacked legal sophistication. See infra notes 191–
94 and accompanying text.
96. D.C. Comics, 912 F.2d at 37.
97. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
98. The RIAA is a trade organization whose members account for the creation,
manufacture, and/or distribution of 85 percent of the music produced in the United States.
See Who We Are, RIAA, http://www.riaa.com/aboutus.php (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
99. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 171–72 (2001); see infra Part III.B.i
(discussing various alternative proposals to the current copyright scheme that would account
for the realities of the digital environment).
100. Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 63, 104 (2003) (giving examples such as “phonographs, photographs, film, and
photocopies”). Furthermore, the very term “analog” derives from a mechanical reproduction
that operates as an “analogy” to the original work. Id.
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In general, a P2P network allows individuals to locate and download files
from another person’s computer over an internet connection.101 Such a filesharing system can enable an “unauthorized transfer” of copyrighted music
files—such as MP3 files—that can be “ripped” from CDs onto a
computer. 102 Widespread dissemination is one of the most remarkable
advances that characterize the digital era.103 Scholars warn that as the costs
of producing copies dramatically falls, “the sharp division between
professional counterfeiters and end-user copiers breaks down.” 104 This
situation is exacerbated by the pure ease of digital copying compared to
physical photocopying or “taping” in the analog era.105
Aside from physical differences, the instant accessibility of a seemingly
endless amount of information has created new “end user [societal]
norms.” 106 A “norm” is a pattern of behavior whose context is defined not
by statutory constraints, but rather through popular practice.107 The
examination of popular practice is crucial to the P2P discussion because
copyright law is not a natural predisposition of Anglo-American culture.108
Gaps often exist between the actual law and typical activity. 109 Studies
have shown this to be a product of the public’s understanding of copyright
as a “mind-numbing collection of inconsistent, indeed incoherent,
Other possible causes for such gaps include
complexities.” 110
exaggerations over a copyright holder’s rights, confusion over the role of
101. See MICHAEL A. EINHORN, MEDIA, TECHNOLOGY, AND COPYRIGHT: INTEGRATING
LAW AND ECONOMICS 79 (2004).
102. Id.
103. See Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1374–75 (2004); see also Ann
Bartow, Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More like a Book, 48 VILL.
L. REV. 13, 17 (2003) (discussing how technological advances have, among other things, led
to greater ease in distribution of copyrighted works); Menell, supra note 100, at 103 (“[T]he
ease with which digital technology enables anyone . . . to reproduce and make
available . . . flawless reproductions of works of authorship has proven a far greater concern
and more wrenching adjustment for copyright law than accommodating computer
software.”).
104. Lemley & Reese, supra note 103, at 1375. Phrased otherwise, almost everyone
today has the means by which to commit certain types of infringement that would be limited
to only professional counterfeiters in the analog era. Id.
105. Id. (noting that copying a CD for someone deprives the record company of a single
sale, while posting the files from that same CD online risks depriving the record company of
thousands of sales).
106. Bartow, supra note 103, at 19–20.
107. Id. at 20–21 (citing Steven Hetcher, Norm Proselytizers Create a Privacy
Entitlement in Cyberspace, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877, 892 n.53 (2001)).
108. Id. at 23.
109. See id. at 43–44 (describing the “gap-creating” nature of copyright law).
110. Jessica Litman, Copyright as Myth, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 235, 237 (1991); see also
Bartow, supra note 103, at 44 (noting that the public is often “better versed in copyright
myths and urban legends than in actual copyright law”). These complexities, and their
relation to norm-gaps, have led the National Research Council to recommend that the digital
age requires a re-working of copyright law in favor of “a greater degree of simplicity, clarity,
straight-forwardness, and easy comprehensibility” with “sufficient flexibility and
adaptability in the law so it can accommodate the future evolution of technologies and
behaviors.” NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
THE INFORMATION AGE 127 (2000).
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publishers and record companies, and the relative ease by which copyright
protection can be established in the first place.111
The transition from an analog to digital world dramatically altered
concepts of typical personal use. In the analog world, 112 music could be
shared among individuals “without any copying across formats.” 113 The
“norm” for similar use in the digital world is fundamentally different
because “sharing [MP3 files] as conveniently as tapes or CDs functionally
requires making copies.” 114 This is crucial in the P2P setting because
studies have shown that teenagers, despite the threat of litigation, consider
P2P networks the most attractive source of obtaining music. 115
The simple act of copying a music file has conflicting legal consequences
depending on its analog or digital nature. The Audio Home Recording Act
of 1992 116 allows the copying—for non-profit use 117—of a song to share
with others so long as that copying is done by analog means. The use of a
P2P network for achieving the exact same purpose, however, has been held
to violate the copyright law.118 Some argue that this fundamental
difference creates confusion over what the public considers to be a noninfringing activity. 119
The extraordinary aspect of digital downloading is that despite the
RIAA’s legal victories, the popularity of P2P continues to rise. 120 The
latest generation of P2P downloading, which operates largely through the
use of torrent files, 121 accounts for over half of the total upload traffic in
North America and 13.2 percent of the downloading traffic.122 While
legitimate internet media services, such as Netflix, have grown at
exponential rates, P2P remains a major aspect of cyber-culture. 123
111. See Bartow, supra note 103, at 46–48 (using the example of the strong language
found in “FBI notice[s]” on videotapes and DVDs).
112. The analog era of music was characterized by records, cassette tapes, and compact
discs as the primary means by which individuals purchased—and infringed—a musical
work. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
113. Bartow, supra note 103, at 22.
114. Id. (noting that the alternative, lending an MP3 file as one would a CD, is
impractical because it would require the additional lending of a computer or MP3 player).
115. See Menell, supra note 100, at 101.
116. 17 U.S.C. § 1008; see Bartow, supra note 103, at 31 (stating that the Act “de facto
legitimized” such analog copying).
117. Academics such as Jessica Litman have argued for the non-profit distinction as an
alternative solution to the P2P crisis. See LITMAN, supra note 99, at 171–91.
118. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020–22 (9th Cir.
2001) (holding Napster liable on a contributory infringement theory).
119. See Bartow, supra note 103, at 43–48 (discussing the phenomenon of “norm gaps”
in copyright law).
120. See Menell, supra note 100, at 101.
121. Torrent files contain URLs of various “trackers.” An end-user who downloads from
a torrent receives pieces of data from multiple users, which the torrent file organizes into a
comprehensive whole. See, e.g., The BitTorrent Protocol Specification, BITTORRENT.ORG,
http://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0003.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
122. BitTorrent Still Dominates Global Internet Traffic, TORRENT FREAK (Oct. 26, 2010),
http://torrentfreak.com/bittorrent-still-dominates-global-internet-traffic-101026/.
123. Thomas Mennecke, The End of an Era—BitTorrent Challenged by Netflix, SLYCK
(Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.slyck.com/story2106_The_End_of_an_Era_BitTorrent_
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P2P’s role as a societal norm is noteworthy as judicial opinions
considering copyright law often involve an inquiry into the public’s use of a
given procedure for making copies. 124 For instance, one of the chief
justifications for the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Sony Corp.
of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 125—that the Betamax
videocassette recorder (VCR) manufacturer was not liable for contributory
infringement—was the fact that the public used the VCR in substantial,
non-infringing ways. 126 Today, P2P downloading is recognized as “illegal,
but common,” even in the eyes of courts.127 This has led some to argue for
a framework that would translate analog norms to their digital
counterparts. 128 For example:
[E]nd use purchasers customarily re-read analog books and loan them to
friends. . . [and those rights should be protected] when the works are
embodied in electronic formats . . . . Conversely, [since] consumers do
not typically destroy analog books nor rent them out for fees, it would be
unnecessary to codify rights to do so specifically with electronic
books. 129

While radical, this approach stresses the importance of societal norms in
applying copyright law.
Even the RIAA, the perennial “bad guy” in the public’s view of the P2P
war, has admitted to the commonality of P2P downloading. 130 In a recent
interview, Cary Sherman, President of the RIAA, admitted that “most
people had no idea that what they were doing was illegal, let alone thought
it was wrong.” 131 Some commentators, including famous P2P defendant
Joel Tenenbaum, 132 have noted that this seems to undermine the RIAA’s
claim that these same defendants are undeserving of innocent infringement
mitigation. 133
Thus, there is a growing tension between the copyright laws and this
fundamentally different arena in which digital downloading, and more
specifically P2P network “sharing,” exists. The next section explores
Challenged_by_Netflix (noting that Netflix now accounts for over 20 percent of downstream
internet content).
124. See generally Bartow, supra note 103 (discussing the importance that copyright
norms have).
125. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
126. Id. at 451.
127. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1227–28 (D. Minn. 2008)
(noting that the defendant “acted like countless other Internet users” when she downloaded
music files from the P2P network KaZaA).
128. Bartow, supra note 103, at 75.
129. Id.
130. See Rocco Castoro, Downloading Some Bullshit: An Interview with the President of
the RIAA, VICE BETA (Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.vice.com/read/downloading-somebullshit-484-v17n8. Sherman went on to say that despite the retention of public relations
firms in an attempt to change the “culture” of digital downloading, the RIAA has come to
realize that “none of the messages resonated.” Id.
131. Id.
132. See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
133. See RIAA President: The Case for the Innocent Infringer, JOEL FIGHTS BACK (Aug.
21, 2010), http://joelfightsback.com/#/2010/08/riaapresiden.
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specific P2P systems and how the RIAA initiated their litigation campaign
against file-sharing.
B. Early RIAA Litigation Strategy
In 1999, a freshman at Northeastern University developed the original
Napster application, setting the stage for the most infamous P2P decision to
date. 134 The system operated through a central server which was owned
and maintained by Napster itself.135 User software was distributed through
Napster’s website, which would access the server and locate “donor songs”
that could then be downloaded. 136 Napster’s servers, however, could not
determine which file a user was searching for or whether the file was under
copyright protection.137
Facing the variety of concerns discussed above, the RIAA initiated the
first generation of P2P lawsuits against services, including Napster, whose
central services maintained the files and processed the user requests.138
The RIAA’s claims at this stage were centered on a theory of indirect
liability through contributory infringement. 139 Contributory infringement,
as opposed to direct infringement, exists when someone “with knowledge
of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the
infringing conduct of another.” 140
Prior to Napster, the most significant contributory infringement decision
was the Supreme Court’s opinion in Sony. 141 That case focused on the
legality of the VCR which, as a reproduction technology, had potentially

134. See MATTHEW RIMMER, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT AND THE CONSUMER REVOLUTION:
HANDS OFF MY IPOD 93 (2007).
135. See id.; A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001)
(describing the technical makeup of the Napster P2P system). See generally Ashley R.
Hudson, Comment, Can’t Get No Satisfaction: The Rise (and Fall?) of Grokster and Peerto-Peer File Sharing, 59 ARK. L. REV. 889, 899–902 (2007) (noting the technological
distinction between Napster and Aimster in the historical development of P2P).
136. A “donor song” is merely a song, in a digital format, that an individual has made
available on Napster’s server. See EINHORN, supra note 101, at 84.
137. See id. Napster’s servers were, however, necessary for the system to survive in
general, as opposed to those employed by Grokster and StreamCast. Jesse M. Feder, Is
Betamax Obsolete?: Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. in the Age of
Napster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 859, 883–84 (2004).
138. There were, as well, practical and economic reasons for the RIAA to attack
facilitators before individual end-users. See Lemley & Reese, supra note 103, at 1349
(“From the perspective of the music industry, it was easier and more effective to shut down
Napster than to sue the millions of people who illegally traded files on Napster.”). Other
file-sharing systems, which were confronted with litigation at this phase, included Scour,
Aimster/Madster, Audiogalaxy, and iMesh. See EINHORN, supra note 101, at 79.
139. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011; see also Feder, supra note 137, at 869–73 (discussing
the theories of indirect liability that characterized this stage in the RIAA’s litigation
strategy).
140. Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971).
141. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984); Feder, supra note 137, at 879–902 (demonstrating the importance of Sony with
regard to P2P litigation).

1470

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

legitimate and illegitimate uses.142 Sony’s Betamax VCR was designed to
allow consumers to make personal copies of television programs.143
Universal and Disney filed their claim in 1976 alleging that Sony (not the
consumers themselves) committed copyright infringement by virtue of
manufacturing and producing VCRs. 144 The U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California denied any relief to the plaintiffs. 145 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, held Sony liable for contributory
infringement, and remanded proceedings to the district court to determine
relief. 146
After remand, the Supreme Court ultimately granted certiorari to review
the judgment. Justice John Paul Stevens produced one of the most powerful
intellectual property opinions in the Court’s history. 147 The potential uses
of the device served as the basis for the Court’s opinion. 148 Since the VCR
could be “widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes,” the Court
held that the mere sale of it could not constitute contributory
infringement. 149 In addition, the Court made an important distinction
between commercial and non-commercial uses of the VCR. 150 Justice
Stevens explained that “although every commercial use of copyrighted
material is presumptively an unfair exploitation . . . [a] challenge to a
noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof either that the
particular use is harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it would
adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work.” 151
142. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 436–37.
143. See RIMMER, supra note 134, at 60 (discussing the technological significance of the
VCR). The Court’s opinion has been heralded by many academics, and the twenty-first
anniversary of the opinion occasioned numerous tributes to it. Gary Shapiro, Chairman of
the Home Recording Rights Coalition, went as far as to call it the “Magna Carta” for the
technological industry. Court Mulls File-Sharing Future, BBC NEWS (Mar. 30, 2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4394371.stm. Sony is such an important precedent
that almost all sixty briefs filed in relation to Metro-Goldwin-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster
Ltd. at the Supreme Court level, regardless of which side they supported, cited to Sony. See
News, ENJOY THE MUSIC (June 20, 2005), http://www.enjoythemusic.com/news/0605/
(discussing the continuing effect of the Sony decision in a digital environment).
144. See Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 917, 917–25
(2005) (discussing the lead up to the Sony decision).
145. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 469 (C.D.
Cal. 1979), rev’d, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417.
146. See Sony, 659 F.2d at 977.
147. See Pamela Samuelson, The Generativity of Sony v. Universal: The Intellectual
Property Legacy of Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1831, 1875 (2006) (remarking that
“[o]f the nearly fifty IP decisions rendered by the Supreme Court during the thirty years that
Justice Stevens has served on the Court, none has had a more significant economic or social
impact”); see also RIMMER, supra note 134, at 63, 65 (surveying the academic discourse on
Justice Stevens’s majority opinion).
148. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 419–20.
149. Id. at 442. The Court continued that “[i]ndeed, it need merely be capable of
substantial noninfringing uses.” Id.
150. See id.; see also EINHORN, supra note 101, at 83 (discussing the Supreme Court’s use
of the commercial versus noncommercial framework in relation to its holding). See generally
LITMAN, supra note 99, at 171–86 (discussing the possible use of the commercial versus
noncommercial distinction for P2P downloading).
151. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451.
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With Sony as the seminal contributory infringement decision, the RIAA
formulated their attack against P2P. In December 1999, the RIAA filed a
complaint against Napster for vicarious and contributory infringement.152
One of Napster’s primary defenses was that Sony barred any finding of
contributory infringement, 153 because an MP3 file could be used as a
“space-shifting” mechanism. 154 This referred to instances in which a
Napster user would merely download music that they already owned on a
CD, thus “shifting” it from physical to digital form by way of Napster, as
opposed to “ripping” the song from a physical CD. 155 The Ninth Circuit
refused to extend the shifting analysis, employed in both Sony and
Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia
Systems, Inc., 156 to Napster because the devices examined in those
decisions “did not also simultaneously involve distribution of the
copyrighted material to the general public.” 157
Napster ultimately lost in the Ninth Circuit, scoring only a minor victory
in the court’s recognition that record companies have the burden of giving
Napster notice of copyrighted works on their service. 158 The RIAA used
the momentum of its victory over Napster to attack similar P2P
downloading services on the same contributory infringement theory. 159
The next wave of litigation focused on P2P systems that stored files on
random users’ computers, where others could send a file request through
online directories for a given geographical region. 160 These new services
were not only technologically distinct, but also attracted far more users than
Napster did at its peak. 161 In October 2001, companies in the music and

152. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2000),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). Vicarious infringement is a
concept related to respondeat superior, in which “a person who has promoted or induced the
infringing acts . . . [is] jointly and severally liable as a ‘vicarious’ infringer.” See, e.g.,
Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971).
153. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019.
154. See id. This argument is similar to the “time-shifting” aspect of the VCR in Sony.
See Sony, 464 U.S. at 423.
155. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019.
156. 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a “space-shift” to a personal MP3
player was a fair use).
157. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019.
158. See id. at 1027; see also RIMMER, supra note 134, at 95.
159. See Hudson, supra note 135, at 902 (stating that the Grokster decision was brought
“[o]n the heels of Napster II”); see also EINHORN, supra note 101, at 88 (noting that the
parallel suits to Napster included claims against Audiogalaxy and Madster).
160. See Feder, supra note 137, at 865–66 (discussing the “supernode” model, as
employed by Grokster, as compared to other types of P2P networks, such as Napster).
161. See John Borland, Suit Hits Popular Post-Napster Network, CNET NEWS (Oct. 3,
2001), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-273855.html (discussing the popularity of second
generation P2P sites). In fact, the argument has been made that the defeat of Napster
increased the general public’s awareness of illegal downloading on P2P networks and,
ultimately, led to the rise in this generation’s downloading. See Kristina Groennings, Note,
Costs and Benefits of the Recording Industry’s Litigation Against Individuals, 20 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 571, 573 (2005).
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movie industries filed suit against the three most prominent of these
networks: KaZaA BV, Grokster, and Music City/StreamCast. 162
The Central District of California originally granted summary judgment
in favor of the P2P networks in Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer Studios v. Grokster,
Ltd. in April 2003. 163 This was an unexpected conclusion given the
outcome in Napster. 164 The court held that the workings of StreamCast and
Grokster were more analogous to the VCR examined in Sony 165 than to
Napster’s centralized system. 166 In 2004, the Ninth Circuit upheld the
verdict using a similar rationale of lack of user control. 167 But the Supreme
Court ultimately vacated that decision and remanded Grokster in 2005 to
apply a new theory of “inducement.” 168 Staying within the framework
established by Sony, Justice David H. Souter articulated a concept of
secondary liability for those “who distribute[] a device with the object of
promoting its use to infringe copyright.” 169
While the Supreme Court’s abrogation of the Central District of
California and Ninth Circuit opinions left the door open to actions against
services, 170 the lower courts’ earlier decisions had already forced copyright
holders to pursue alternative strategies and had opened the floodgates to
litigation against individual end-users, which caused the filing of lawsuits

162. See Rimmer, supra note 134, at 96. KaZaA BV ultimately settled, but the KaZaA
software had been sold to Sharman Networks, which therefore was still involved in the
litigation at this stage. See EINHORN, supra note 101, at 88–91; Feder, supra note 137, at
879–93 (surveying P2P litigation beginning with Napster and including the Grokster
decision).
163. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029,
1031 (C.D. Cal. 2003), aff’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated by 545 U.S. 913
(2005).
164. See EINHORN, supra note 101, at 89; see also Hudson, supra note 135, at 906 (noting
that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Grokster was a “stunning victory over the heavy hitters
of the entertainment industry”).
165. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1043 (remarking that “[d]efendants distribute and
support software, the users of which can and do choose to employ it for both lawful and
unlawful ends”); see also EINHORN, supra note 101, at 89 (discussing the district court’s
rationale in extending a Sony analysis to the P2P networks).
166. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1041 (noting that “[n]either StreamCast nor Grokster
facilitates the exchange of files between users in the way Napster did); see Feder, supra note
137, at 883–84 (discussing the technological differences between Napster and Grokster as an
additional justification for the Ninth Circuit’s outcome in Grokster).
167. See Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1164; see also RIMMER, supra note 134, at 97–98
(explaining that the Ninth Circuit decided that Grokster could not be held liable “because
they could not police the conduct of their users, as Napster could”).
168. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 941. After remand, Grokster reached a settlement with the
RIAA, the terms of which included that a warning be posted on Grokster’s website stating
the legality of their P2P network. See RIMMER, supra note 134, at 104.
169. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936–37 (continuing that the new rule “premises liability on
purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to compromise
legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful promise”); see also Feder,
supra note 137, at 881–84.
170. In the wake of Grokster, Sharman Networks, which had recently purchased KaZaA,
settled, while StreamCast was found liable under the new theory of “inducement” at the
district court level after remand. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
454 F. Supp. 2d 966, 983–95 (C.D. Cal. 2006); RIMMER, supra note 134, at 104–05.
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against 261 individual music downloaders on a single day. 171 By 2008, the
RIAA had sued over 30,000 individuals for copyright infringement
stemming from digital downloading. 172 While the vast majority of these
claims have settled, the next part examines a mitigation defense that some
of those defendants have attempted to employ.
III. THE INNOCENT INFRINGEMENT DEBATE
This part examines the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ recent jurisprudence
on the innocent infringer defense in P2P settings. More specifically, it
examines how those courts have interpreted § 402(d) of the Copyright Act
as an absolute bar to claims of innocent infringement rooted in the phrase
“access to published copies,” despite not conducting a fact-finding inquiry
into the defendant’s actual circumstance.173 This part concludes with a
survey of various critiques of these opinions based in part on the Second
Circuit’s decision in D.C. Comics.
A. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ Non-application of Innocent
Infringement to the P2P Setting
In BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 174 a defendant in a P2P downloading action
attempted to apply both fair use and innocent infringement defenses to
copyright infringement. 175 Cecilia Gonzalez—an unemployed mother of
five 176—was ultimately held liable for $22,500 in statutory damages for
thirty acts of copyright infringement. 177
Gonzalez originally downloaded more than 1,370 copyrighted songs
from the KaZaA network, 178 which she claimed was merely a “sampling”
for purchase at a later date.179 Furthermore, Gonzalez owned the vast
majority of the disputed songs on over 250 CDs, which she claimed she had
downloaded in order to avoid the labor of ripping them to her computer. 180
Despite the confusion over when she purchased some of the songs—either
after or before they were downloaded—Gonzalez conceded that she never

171. See RIAA v. the People: Five Years Later, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. 1 (Sept. 30,
2008), https://www.eff.org/files/eff-riaa-whitepaper.pdf [hereinafter Five Years Later]. See
generally Groennings, supra note 161, at 572–77 (discussing the importance the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion had in causing the RIAA to “focus[] exclusively against direct infringers”);
John Borland, RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers, CNET NEWS (Sept. 8, 2003),
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023_3-5072564.html (further noting that the RIAA considered
such personal infringement to be “egregious”).
172. See Five Years Later, supra note 171, at 1.
173. See infra notes 191–93, 212–15 and accompanying text.
174. 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005).
175. See id. at 889, 892.
176. See RIAA v. the People: Two Years Later, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. 6 (Nov. 3, 2005),
http://w2.eff.org/IP/P2P/RIAAatTWO_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter Two Years Later].
177. See Gonzalez, 430 F.3d at 889; see also RIMMER, supra note 134, at 211–14
(surveying the Gonzalez decision).
178. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d at 889.
179. Id. at 889–90.
180. See Two Years Later, supra note 176.
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owned a legitimate version of thirty songs that formed the basis for the
plaintiff’s action. 181
Gonzalez first claimed that her actions constituted a “fair use.”182 Fair
use is an exception to copyright holders’ exclusive rights and a defense to
copyright infringement that asks a district court to consider four factors. 183
In evaluating her defense, the court examined the fourth factor, “‘the effect
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.’” 184 Gonzalez contended that her sampling increased the overall
market value of the songs as a form of extra advertising, akin to “try-beforeyou-buy.” 185 Both the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois and the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument, holding that
downloading a full-length copy of a song cannot be considered a fair use.186
On appeal, Judge Frank H. Easterbrook cited both Grokster and Napster in
countering the economic benefit theory of “try-before-you-buy,” as he
reasoned that many people do not end up buying the songs in question.187
After Gonzalez was found liable, BMG Music chose to receive statutory
damages under § 504(c)(1) of the Copyright Act, as opposed to proving
actual injury, and Gonzalez sought damage mitigation as an innocent
infringer. 188 Both the trial and appellate courts, however, held that
§ 402(d) 189 barred innocent infringer mitigation because Gonzalez had
“access” to copyright notice on published CDs that contained the songs she
ultimately downloaded.190
Judge Easterbrook’s interpretation of § 402(d) was predicated on a theory
of inquiry. 191 Gonzalez had “access” to proper notice, he reasoned, not
because there was a digital stamp of such notice, 192 but because she “could
181. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d at 890.
182. Id. at 889.
183. These four factors are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
184. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d at 890 (quoting § 107).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 891; see RIMMER, supra note 134, at 211–12 (discussing the Northern District
of Illinois’s decision).
187. See Gonzalez, 430 F.3d at 890; see also RIMMER, supra note 134, at 212–13
(describing Judge Easterbrook’s rejection of Cecila Gonzalez’s fair use claim approvingly).
188. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d at 891–92.
189. 17 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2006). The text of § 402(d) reads: “If a notice of copyright . . .
appears on the published phonorecord or phonorecords to which a defendant in a copyright
infringement suit had access, then no weight shall be given to such a defendant’s
interposition of a defense based on innocent infringement . . . .” Id.
190. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d at 892.
191. See RIMMER, supra note 134, at 212.
192. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d at 892. While acknowledging that Gonzalez “downloaded data
rather than discs, and the data lacked copyright notices,” Judge Easterbrook held that the
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have learned, had she inquired, that the music was under copyright.”193
This interpretation has been called “troubling” because there was no factfinding inquiry into whether the defendant did—or even practically could—
see the notice in question.194
The Fifth Circuit has recently taken a similar approach in Maverick
Recording Co. v. Harper. 195 Whitney Harper, a sixteen-year-old from
Texas, was charged with downloading thirty-seven songs through the
KaZaA network. 196 It was undisputed that Harper did not rip any of these
songs from her own CDs, but rather downloaded them directly from the
internet to her computer.197 The plaintiffs—various recording companies
who held the copyrights to the songs in question—discovered Harper’s
activity through the use of MediaSentry, a company that specializes in
forensic investigation of computer systems. 198 MediaSentry initially
discovered that 544 songs had been “shared” from Harper’s computer in
2004. 199
During discovery, MediaSentry was allowed to reexamine Harper’s
computer. 200 This revealed that, in 2005, the operating system had been
reinstalled and therefore the majority of the alleged 544 files had been
destroyed in the process. 201 However, this new investigation discovered
another group of 700 sound recordings. 202 Due to the confusion
surrounding file destruction, the plaintiffs’ amended complaint only
pursued infringement claims for thirty-seven counts of copyright
infringement. 203
Similar to Gonzalez, the plaintiffs elected to receive statutory damages
under § 504(c)(1), only to be greeted with a claim of innocent
infringement. 204 Harper contended that she did not understand the nature of
a P2P network, but rather believed that her actions were “akin to listening
to a non-infringing internet radio station.” 205
“statutory question is whether ‘access’ to legitimate works was available rather than whether
infringers earlier in the chain attached copyright notices to the pirated works.” Id.
193. Id.
194. See RIMMER, supra note 134, at 213–14; infra Part III.B.ii.
195. 598 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 590 (2010); see generally Chad
A. Sanders, Note, Maverick Recording Co. v. Whitney Harper: How the Fifth Circuit
Virtually Eliminated Innocent Infringers Without Noticing, 13 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
295 (2010) (commenting on the Harper decision at the circuit court level).
196. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Harper, 131 S. Ct. 590 (No. 10–94), 2010
WL 2797543, at *3.
197. Harper, 598 F.3d at 194.
198. Id.
199. Of these files, a significant amount were copyrighted sound recordings owned by the
plaintiffs. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.; see Sanders, supra note 195, at 295 (discussing the use of MediaSentry during
discovery).
202. Fifteen of these songs formed the basis for new allegations in the plaintiffs’
complaint. Harper, 598 F.3d at 194–95.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 198; see Sanders, supra note 195, at 295–96 (discussing Whitney Harper’s
claim of innocence).
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The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas granted
plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and entered an injunction against
Whitney Harper in August 2008. 206 The court did, however, find a genuine
issue of fact as to Harper’s “innocence.” 207 The plaintiffs reserved the right
to appeal the innocent infringer issue if Harper appealed the judgment.208
Interestingly, the plaintiffs only moved for judgment in the amount of $200
per infringement, which was granted. 209 Harper appealed the grant of
summary judgment to the Fifth Circuit and the plaintiffs cross-appealed on
the innocent infringement issue.210
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s failure to grant summary
judgment on the innocent infringement issue, relying on the text of
§ 402(d). 211 Writing for the court, Judge Edith Brown Clement found that
the circumstances of Harper’s P2P downloading made innocent
infringement mitigation “unavailable to her as a matter of law.”212 The
court held that the “plain language” of the notice exception overrode
Harper’s claim that “she was too young and naive to understand that the
copyrights on published music applied to downloaded music.” 213
Examining the context of the simultaneous elimination of the notice
requirement and the creation of § 402(d)’s notice exception,214 the court
noted that “it would make no sense for a copyright defendant’s subjective
intent to erode the working of § 402(d), which gives publishers the option
to trade the extra burden of providing copyright notice for absolute
protection against the innocent infringer defense.”215 The court therefore
held that Harper could not claim that her own unsophistication merited
mitigation because the plaintiffs had, pursuant to § 402(d), taken the extra
step of attaching physical copyright notice to their CDs. 216
With the innocent infringer defense eliminated as a matter of law, the
court proceeded to examine the amount due under the statutory damage
provision. Given that the plaintiffs only sought the statutory minimum of
$750 on appeal, 217 however, the actual “culpability” of Harper was

206. Harper, 598 F.3d at 195.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. This is somewhat ironic because $200 per act is the exact minimum allowed
after innocent infringement damage mitigation. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006).
210. Harper, 598 F.3d at 195.
211. Id. at 199.
212. Id. at 198.
213. Id. at 199. Judge Clement further noted that “Harper’s reliance on her own
understanding of copyright law—or lack thereof—is irrelevant in the context of § 402(d).”
Id.
214. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
215. Harper, 598 F.3d at 199; see Sanders, supra note 195, at 301 (noting that the “Fifth
Circuit only cited § 402’s legislative intent and history in its rejection of the lower court’s
opinion”).
216. Harper, 598 F.3d at 199.
217. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006).
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effectively a non-issue and no jury trial was warranted. 218 The Fifth Circuit
granted the plaintiffs an award of $27,750 for the thirty-seven songs. 219
Harper sought review of her judgment by the Supreme Court, but certiorari
was ultimately denied. 220
Thus, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have interpreted § 402(d) to
automatically defeat a claim of innocent infringement in a P2P download
setting by broadly reading the word “access” to mean a general availability
and a duty to inquire as to whether the songs in question were protected
under the copyright law.
B. The (Predominantly) Academic Critique of Harper and Gonzalez’s
Understanding of § 402(d)
In general, criticisms of the RIAA’s actions against P2P network users
have been plentiful. Popular points of debate include excessive damage
claims for willful infringers 221 and an overly aggressive strategy under
which several lawsuits were brought on completely frivolous grounds.222
The decisions in Harper and Gonzalez were likewise subject to academic
discussion. 223 This section examines two facets of those arguments
opposing the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. First, some critics, including

218. Harper, 598 F.3d at 199 (stating that “because Plaintiffs requested the minimum
statutory damages under § 504(c)(1), Harper’s culpability is not an issue and there are no
issues left for trial.”).
219. Id.
220. Justice Samuel A. Alito did, however, dissent from the denial of certiorari. See
Harper v. Maverick Recording Co., 131 S. Ct. 590, 590 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
221. One now-famous case is that of Joel Tenenbaum, where the original award of
$22,500 per song for willful infringement was recently held to be a violation of the his due
process rights and reduced to $2,500 per song. See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum,
721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 87 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, Nos. 101883, 10-1947, 10-2052, 2011 WL 4133920 (1st Cir. Sept. 16, 2011). Another example of
an extraordinarily high damage award is the case of Jammie Thomas-Rasset, where, in the
latest retrial, a jury awarded $80,000 per song for willful infringement, amounting to $1.9
million in total. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1050 (D.
Minn. 2010).
222. See, e.g., Ray Beckerman, Oregon RIAA Victim Fights Back; Sues RIAA for
Electronic Trespass, Violations of Computer Fraud & Abuse, Invasion of Privacy, RICO,
Fraud, RECORDING INDUSTRY VS THE PEOPLE (Oct. 3, 2005, 9:50 AM),
http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/2005/10/oregon-riaa-victim-fights-backsues.html (single parent suing RIAA back); Benny Evangelista, Download Lawsuit
Dismissed / RIAA Drops Claim that Grandmother Stole Online Music, S.F. CHRON. (Sept.
25,
2003),
http://articles.sfgate.com/2003-09-25/business/17508258_1_riaa-kazaadownloading; Andrew Orlowski, RIAA Sues the Dead, REGISTER (Feb. 5, 2005, 2:30 PM),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/02/05/riaa_sues_the_dead; see also D.C. Comics Inc. v.
Mini Gift Shop, 912 F.2d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that Warner Brother’s harassed the
defendants in the early stages of discovery). This has led to an overall negative perception
of the RIAA. See Catherine Greenman, Taking Sides in the Napster War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
31, 2000, at G1. See generally RIMMER, supra note 134, at 206–18 (discussing various
improper lawsuits filed on behalf of the RIAA); Groennings, supra note 161, at 576–87
(discussing the inadvertent negative impact the RIAA’s strategy has fostered).
223. See RIMMER, supra note 134, at 216–18 (surveying the academic responses to the
RIAA’s litigation strategy).
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Justice Samuel A. Alito, focus on the aspect that § 402(d) may not be
applicable to P2P downloading because the law and its terms were founded
in an analog era.224 Others, such as Professor Charles Nesson, argue that
even if § 402(d) did apply to the digital age, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’
interpretation of “access”—and their creation of a duty of inquiry—is
overly ambiguous. 225 Lastly, this section revisits D.C. Comics as a possible
point of conflict among the circuits.
1. Distinctions Between the Analog and Digital Worlds
As discussed in Part II, the analog world in which the Berne Convention
and § 402(d) were implemented was dramatically different than the present
digital environment.226 In his dissent from Harper’s denial of review,
Justice Alito began by acknowledging the “strong argument that § 402(d)
does not apply in a case involving the downloading of digital music
files.” 227
As a starting point, § 402(d) was developed before the internet or P2P
downloading was even an inkling, and therefore, the copying against which
those statutes sought to protect was analog in nature. 228 The fundamental
difference between these two paradigms has not been acknowledged by
either the Seventh or Fifth circuit.229 Justice Alito focused on the context
of § 402(d) to posit the theory that it may be inapplicable in the digital
era. 230 The logic of that section was founded on the analog understanding
that since an individual is copying music from an object that contains the
appropriate notice, they possess a “reason to believe that his or her acts
constituted an infringement of copyright.” 231 Because “a person who
downloads a digital music file generally does not see any material object
bearing a copyright notice,” the fundamental nature of § 402(d) is called
into question. 232
224. See, e.g., Harper v. Maverick Recording Co., 131 S. Ct. 590, 590 (2010) (Alito, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
225. See Motion of Charles Nesson et. al. as Amicus Curiae for Leave to File Brief in
Support of Petitioner at 10, Harper, 131 S. Ct. at 590 (No. 10–94), 2010 WL 3279299, at
*10 [hereinafter Nesson Brief].
226. See supra Part II.A.
227. Harper, 131 S. Ct. at 590 (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (stating that
§402(d) was “adopted in 1988, well before digital music files became available”).
228. See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 10:63 (4th ed. 2011) (explaining that § 402(d) was originally concerned with
tape and record piracy); see also Lemley & Reese, supra note 103, at 1374–75 (explaining
how digitization changed the landscape for copyright infringement “as the costs of producing
and disseminating copies approach zero, the public goods problem gets worse, because the
ratio of cost of creation to the cost of imitation approaches infinity” and furthermore “unlike
end-user copying in the analog environment, online copying by end users can be quite
substantial”).
229. See Nesson Brief, supra note 225, at 26 (stating that the “two courts that have
addressed this issue as it arises in a digital context have failed to take account of either the
statute or the realities of the internet”).
230. See Harper, 131 S. Ct. at 590 (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
231. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006); see supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text.
232. Harper, 131 S. Ct. at 590 (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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In general, there is no standard way for an end-user to see a copyright
notice in a digital environment. 233 While popular music services, such as
Apple’s iTunes, contain the appropriate notice, it is extremely doubtful that
any song downloaded through a P2P network would. 234 Furthermore,
Justice Alito noted that the plain language of § 402(d) presents another
problem if it were to apply to digital files. 235 That section’s limitation only
applies when notice appears on “phonorecords.” 236 Phonorecords are
defined as “material object[s] in which the sounds are first fixed.”237
Therefore, it is doubtful that an MP3 or any other type of digital music file,
even if notice was in some way attached to it, would qualify as a
“phonorecord” under the statute.238
Some commentators believe that analog-based laws are so ill-suited to
the digital age that the copyright regime should be dramatically altered.239
The majority of these proposals focus on the ease, extent, and
overwhelming commonality of modern-day digital downloading as a basis
for their disillusioned view of the current system. 240
Ann Litman has posed a possible solution to the “digital dilemma”241
premised on a radical redrawing of copyright boundaries. 242 The system
would build off the public perception–and usually misconception–of a
“distinction between commercial and noncommercial behavior.”243 This
view directly addresses some of the concerns of innocent infringement as
the question would become “what effects [downloading from a P2P
network] had on the copyright holder’s opportunities for commercial

233. See Chad J. Woodford, Innocent Infringers and Copyright Notices in the iTunes Age,
L. OFF. CHAD J. WOODFORD (July 21, 2010, 8:11 PM), http://woodfordiplaw.com/blog/
2010/7/21/innocent-infringers-and-copyright-notices-in-the-itunes-age.html.
234. Compare id., with BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. 2005)
(explaining that the disputed songs in Gonzalez did not contain any copyright notice “on”
them).
235. See Harper, 131 S. Ct. at 590 (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
236. 17 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2006).
237. Id. § 101.
238. See Harper, 131 S. Ct. at 590–91 (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Ben
Sheffner, Peer-to-Peer Defendant Seeks Supreme Court Review of ‘Innocent Infringer’
Ruling,
COPYRIGHTS
&
CAMPAIGNS
(May
27,
2010,
8:43
AM),
http://copyrightsandcampaigns.blogspot.com/2010/05/peer-to-peer-defendant-seekssupreme.html.
239. See infra Part III.B.i.
240. See Lemley & Reese, supra note 103, at 1373–79 (premising the alternative dispute
resolution system on the fact that the digital era sees “substantial” copying done by
traditional end-users in addition to professional counterfeiters); see also LITMAN, supra note
99, at 180–81 (predicating her commercial/non-commercial copyright structure on mass
public perception concerning the legality and ease of MP3 downloads and using Napster as
an example for the system’s potential uses).
241. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 110, at 23–25 (noting the challenges that
technological advances have presented to copyright legislation).
242. See LITMAN, supra note 99, at 180; see also supra notes 150–51 and accompanying
text (describing Justice Stevens’s distinction between commercial and non-commercial use
in Sony).
243. LITMAN, supra note 99, at 180.
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exploitation.” 244 The commercial effect standard would be narrowly
defined so that only “large-scale interference[s]” by substantial uploaders—
but not personal, end-user digital downloads—would be actionable. 245
While a self-admitted “radical” change, Litman’s alternative system further
acknowledges the current statutory regime’s inadequacy in the digital
era. 246
Mark Lemley and R. Anthony Reese have proposed other alternatives.247
Their theories also respond to the shortcomings of the RIAA’s earlier
strategy of suing “facilitators” as a problematic and potentially dangerous
“[l]umping [of] legal and illegal conduct together.”248 One system
proposed by Lemley and Reese would involve a levy, through which
copyright holders would be compensated in “a form of blanket compulsory
license[s], authorizing copying in exchange for a set fee.” 249 This levy
would be automatically attached to infringement-prone devices, such as
computers, or P2P user software, thus eliminating any need for P2P civil
actions, innocent or not. 250 While such a system has the advantage of ease
of enforcement, the authors acknowledge that this system—similar to suing
indirect infringers—does not target the actual infringing public.251
Another proposal would involve an independent dispute resolution
The Internet
system designed to address digital downloading. 252
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) has already
implemented a similar system with regard to internet domain name
trademark disputes. 253 While ICANN’s system does have some procedural

244. Id.; see also Greenman, supra note 222 (discussing the public’s perception of P2P
downloading).
245. LITMAN, supra note 99, at 180–81 (“The fact that a particular individual’s viewing or
copying of a digital work might itself supplant the sale of a license to view or copy if such
licenses were legally required should count neither as making money nor as large-scale
interference with commercial opportunities.”).
246. Id. at 180.
247. Lemley & Reese, supra note 103, at 1395.
248. Id. at 1379. The authors focused on the problematic “binary choice” seen in
Grokster and Napster, where courts are forced with a decision to ban or not to ban that is illsuited to the reality that such networks have both legitimate and illegitimate uses. Id. at
1380.
249. Id. at 1406. Lemley and Reese’s system is based off of similar proposals by William
Fisher and Neil Netanel. See generally WILLIAM FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP:
TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT (2004); Neil W. Netanel, Impose a
Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 2
(2003).
250. Lemley & Reese, supra note 103, at 1406.
251. Id. at 1408.
252. See id. at 1410–25.
253. See id. at 1411. ICANN’s system, the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, allows
for trademark disputes to be heard in an expedited, organized manner in front of a panel of
private dispute resolution experts. See Have a Problem? Dispute Resolution Options,
ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/dispute-resolution/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2011); see also
Lemley & Reese, supra note 103, at 1411 (noting that, as of 2004, the UDRP system had
“resolved about 7500 such disputes involving over 13,000 domain names in four years, at a
cost of $1200-$1500 each and an average resolution time of little more than a month”).
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deficiencies, 254 Lemley and Reese argue that an analogous system for
“relatively straightforward claims of copyright infringement . . . against
those alleged to have uploaded copyrighted works to a p2p network and
thus made them available for downloading by others” would be
beneficial. 255 By limiting the dispute system to uploaders who have
contributed a substantial number of songs to a P2P network, 256 this would
(similar to Litman’s commercial distinction) protect this Note’s
paradigmatic innocent infringer.
2. Access and Inquiry
This next section focuses on aspects of criticism that assume that
§ 402(d) applies to the scenario in question. Critics focusing on this aspect
argue that the circuits have incorrectly interpreted the term “access” and
unjustly created an ambiguous duty of inquiry on virtually all P2P users that
prevents them from innocent infringement mitigation by operation of law.
a. Access
As discussed in Part III.A, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have held
“access” to mean a broad, general availability of a published record marked
Phrased otherwise, notice is
with appropriate copyright notice. 257
satisfied—and hence § 402(d) bars innocent infringement mitigation—
when the copyright holder affixes notice to a CD jewel case and that case is
made available through some public means, typically through sale at a
store. 258 Interestingly, both circuits have explicitly acknowledged that there
is no standard way to affix notice to a digital song, 259 and have formulated
their understanding of “access” accordingly, viewing “the statutory question
[as] whether ‘access’ to legitimate works was available rather than whether
infringers earlier in the chain attached copyright notices to the pirated
works.” 260
Copyright blogger Joe Gratz argues that this definition is troubling
because the Seventh Circuit does “not describe how or why this ‘access’
exists, but it apparently finds access in the fact that Gonzalez could have
gone to the record store and inspected authorized copies.”261 Therefore, the
argument has been made that the plain language of the statute, as well as its

254. See Lemley & Reese, supra note 103, at 1412 (noting a lack of a standardized
appeals process for disputes).
255. Id. at 1413.
256. Id. at 1419 (Lemley and Reese’s proposal would set the minimum at fifty works,
which would also look to incentivize various copyright holders to join their complaints, thus
further streamlining the process).
257. See supra Part III.A.
258. See BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. 2005).
259. See supra notes 233–34 and accompanying text.
260. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d at 892.
261. Joe Gratz, 7th Cir.: P2P Downloading Is Not Fair Use, JOEGRATZ.NET (Dec. 10,
2005), http://joegratzdotnet.nfshost.com/?p=737.
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legislative history, merits the opposite reading, and bars innocent infringer
mitigation only “when notice is sufficiently presented to the infringer.” 262
Harvard Law Professor Charles Nesson, notable for his work in other
controversial copyright suits,263 filed, along with others, an amicus curiae
brief in support of Harper’s appeal to the Supreme Court.264 In Professor
Nesson’s view, § 402(d)’s requisite “access”—as required by the circuits—
is incompatible with digital downloading. Because “a person viewing an
internet file in cyberspace who genuinely does not know or have reason to
know that the file is copyrighted, [published notices in record stores]
provide neither actual notice nor reasonable notice of copyright.” 265 Others
also feel the underlying rationale of Harper is “thin,” because the Fifth
Circuit drew its conclusion solely from legislative history and “relied
almost exclusively on a treatise to support its holding.” 266
Justice Alito seemingly agrees with the above criticism, remarking that
“[u]nder this interpretation, it is not necessary that the infringer actually see
a material object with the copyright notice.” 267 Directly attacking the
rationale of Gonzalez, Justice Alito noted that this scheme rendered
innocent infringement mitigation unavailable merely because an individual
could have researched the song in question. 268 The problematic interplay
between the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ understandings of “access” and
inquiry is examined in greater detail in the following subsection.
These various critics are not alone in their understanding of “access,” as
the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia employed a
similar rationale in Electra Entertainment Group v. McDowell.269
McDowell was based on a nearly identical fact pattern as Harper. 270 The
defendant, Sarah McDowell, was only thirteen or fourteen years old at the
time of infringement. 271 McDowell admitted to forty-eight counts of
copyright infringement from P2P network downloads. 272 The plaintiffs
262. Nesson Brief, supra note 225, at 26.
263. Professor Nesson has given legal assistance to such other notable P2P defendants as
Jammie Thomas-Rasset, see Nate Anderson, “It is Groundhog Day”: Third Jammie Thomas
P2P Trial Begins, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 2, 2010, 9:21 PM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/news/2010/11/third-jammie-thomas-p2p-trial-begins-it-is-groundhog-day.ars;
and
Joel Tenenbaum, see John Schwartz, Tilting at Internet Barrier, a Stalwart is Upended, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2009, at A11.
264. See generally Nesson Brief, supra note 225.
265. Id. at 10.
266. Sanders, supra note 195, at 300–01 (while a criticism, the author ultimately
concluded that the decision was “properly articulated” with respect to the interplay between
§ 402(d) and § 504(c)(2)).
267. Harper v. Maverick Recording Co., 131 S. Ct. 590, 591 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
268. See id. (stating that “it is enough [under Gonzalez] that the infringer could have
ascertained that the work was copyrighted”).
269. No. 4:06-CV-115, 2007 WL 3286622, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 6, 2007).
270. See id. at *1; supra notes 195–210 and accompanying text.
271. See Electra, 2007 WL 3286622, at *2.
272. Id. at *1 (noting that while plaintiffs contended that McDowell was “actively
distributing more than one thousand songs” on a P2P network, they only sought damages for
forty-eight acts of infringement).
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moved for summary judgment and an award of $750 per song in statutory
damages, totaling $36,000. 273 In response, McDowell moved for a jury
trial on the issue of innocent infringer mitigation under § 504(c)(2).274
The Middle District of Georgia began its analysis with an examination of
Gonzalez and § 402(d)’s applicability to P2P downloading. 275 The
plaintiffs contended that Sarah McDowell’s actions were analogous to
Cecilia Gonzalez’s because she had “access to copyright notice at any
location sound recordings are sold” and therefore was not due mitigation.276
Further, they argued that because McDowell had purchased a CD in the
past—although not necessarily one containing copyright notice or songs
controlled by the plaintiffs—that McDowell had practical access to notice
as well. 277 While the court considered the fact that McDowell had
purchased a CD in the past relevant,278 it held that she “did not state
whether she regularly purchased compact disks from retail stores at the time
she infringed upon Plaintiffs’ copyrights.” 279 Moreover, given the young
age of the defendant, further inquiry into the defendant’s “access” was
justified because at the time of infringement “any compact disk she may
have owned would have been bought for her by her mother.”280 If this was
so, commentators have noted that it would be the mother who had notice
and not the daughter who merely received the CDs and later downloaded
separate songs through a P2P network. 281
The court found there to be two legitimate questions of fact and denied
the plaintiff’s motion. 282 First, by virtue of the defendant’s young age and
unsophistication, there was a question as to whether she was “aware or
ha[d] reason to believe that her acts constituted an infringement of
copyright.” 283 Assuming arguendo that the first question would be
answered in the affirmative, the court found another question as to whether
Sarah McDowell “had access to the notice of copyright such that her
innocent infringer defense has no mitigating effect.” 284 Thus, unlike the

273. Id.; see also Zohar Efroni, Electra Entertainment v. McDowell: Is a Thirteen Year
Old Still Innocent (Infringer)?, STAN. L. SCH.: CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Nov. 14, 2007,
5:17 PM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/node/5610.
274. Electra, 2007 WL 3286622, at *1.
275. Id. at *2.
276. Id.
277. Id. at *2 n.2.
278. The court’s consideration of this fact is in-and-of itself a large departure from
Gonzalez and Harper. See id. at *2.
279. Id.
280. Id. at *2 n.2.
281. See Efroni, supra note 273 (noting that practically, the fact that the mother in
McDowell may be on notice is of little significance because if the daughter was to be found
liable, it would be the mother who ultimately paid damages).
282. Id. (noting that the two factual questions were interrelated).
283. Id. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006). Justice Alito agrees with this
interpretation that age should be a factor in an innocent infringement inquiry. See infra note
293 and accompanying text.
284. Electra, 2007 WL 3286622, at *2.
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courts in Gonzalez and Harper, § 402(d) did not have an automatically
preclusive effect. 285
b. Duty of Inquiry
Another critique focuses on the circuits’ interpretation of “access” to
seemingly create a duty of inquiry. Such a duty, it is argued, “imposes an
undue burden on all internet users, no matter how young and unschooled, to
determine whether files accessible to them in cyberspace are
copyrighted.” 286 One critic has called this interpretation “shaky” at best.287
Joe Gratz notes that this problematic definition of “access” is a mere rubber
stamp and warned that “if ‘access’ in the copyright context now means that
someone could have inspected a copy of a work had they inquired, we may
find some mighty odd results in cases looking to whether a small-potatoes
plaintiff has shown that a big-time movie studio had access to her
unsolicited screenplay.” 288
This ambiguity was a major point of concern for Justice Alito, who stated
that the “Fifth Circuit did not specify what sort of inquiry a person who
downloads digital music files is required to make,” 289 although he noted
that those courts “had in mind” various activities such as “research on the
Internet or a visit to a local store in search of a compact disc containing the
songs in question.” 290 In recognition of this ambiguity, some advocate—at
the minimum—for a fact finding inquiry to determine how and if the notice
bearing CDs were practically accessible to the defendant.291
In examining whether an infringer has met their duty of inquiry, the Fifth
and Seventh Circuits have discounted their claim of a “lack of legal
sophistication.” 292 Justice Alito noted that disregarding such a crucial
factor would be incorrect if § 402(d) did not automatically eliminate a
finding of innocent infringement and the determinative question were
simply whether the defendant had “reason to believe” that her actions were
illegal. 293

285. See supra notes 186–92, 211–16 and accompanying text.
286. Nesson Brief, supra note 225, at 12.
287. Gratz, supra note 261.
288. Id.
289. Harper v. Maverick Recording Co., 131 S. Ct. 590, 591 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
290. Id.
291. See Phil Hill, Maverick Recording Company v. Whitney Harper, MUSIC THINK TANK
(June 7, 2010), http://www.musicthinktank.com/blog/maverick-recording-company-vwhitney-harper.html (noting that, under Gonzalez and Harper’s definition of access,
“everyone is beholden to a warning that they may not understand, may not know to look for,
located on an object that they may not know exists, located in a store [that] they may never
go to”). Hill further notes that it is not unreasonable, especially in locations such as Texas
(where Whitney Harper lived) to be more than fifty miles away from the nearest record store.
Id.
292. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
293. Harper, 131 S. Ct. at 591 (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Justice
Alito continued in remarking that “[a]lthough ‘reason to believe’ is an objective standard, it
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In her petition to the Supreme Court, Harper referred the Court’s
attention to D.C. Comics, where the Second Circuit used objective criteria
in discussing the infringer’s “lack of business sophistication” and possible
duty of inquiry. 294 While that case dealt with the sale of t-shirts and other
movie merchandise, the court nevertheless examined whether a defendant
claiming innocent infringement under § 504(c)(2) ever has a duty to inquire
as to the copyright status of the goods in question.295 Similar to Whitney
Harper, the various shop owners claimed that they were too naïve to
understand the nature of their actions. 296 Furthermore, both matters
involved infringing copies that were entirely indistinguishable from a
proper, notice-bearing version. 297 Taken together, the Second Circuit found
that the defendants were too naïve to “prompt an inquiry into the source of
the unmarked goods,” and were therefore proper recipients of § 504(c)(2)
mitigation.298
IV. WHY THE BROAD DEFENSE-ELIMINATING READING OF § 402(D)
IS INCORRECT
Having analyzed the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ interpretations of
innocent infringer claims in Part III, this Note argues that the broad reading
of “access” taken by those circuits is improper for a variety of reasons.
First, the legislative history demonstrates that § 402(d) was implemented in
is by no means clear that certain objective characteristics of the infringer—such as age—
may not be taken into account.” Id.
294. D.C. Comics Inc. v. Mini Gift Shop, 912 F.2d 29, 35–36 (2d Cir. 1990); see Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 196, at 13. The petition contended that Harper and D.C.
Comics demonstrated a stereotypical circuit split on the issue of “whether a plaintiff may
avoid the defense of innocent infringement by including a copyright notice on published
copies of its copyrighted work even though those copies are not the copies that the infringer
used for its infringement.” Id. However, even Justice Alito, in his dissent from denial of
certiorari, noted that there is no circuit split on such an issue. See Harper, 131 S. Ct. at 591
(Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
295. D.C. Comics, 912 F.2d at 36. It is essential to note, however, that § 402(d) does
have a near-identical sister provision applying to non-sound recordings. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 401(d) (2006). Section 401(d) has been applied to a variety of works; the most analogous
to the infringement seen in D.C. Comics has been fabric designs. See generally Langman
Fabrics v. Graff Californiawear, Inc., 160 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998).
296. Compare D.C. Comics, 912 F.2d at 35 (stating that “defendants were unsophisticated
merchants”), with Maverick Recording Co. v. Harper, 598 F.3d 193, 199 (5th Cir.)
(recounting that Harper “contended only that she was too young and naive to understand” the
seriousness of her actions), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 590 (2010).
297. Compare D.C. Comics, 912 F.2d at 35 (stating that “a layman would not be able to
distinguish between licensed and unlicensed [Batman] goods based on the style or quality of
the art work”), with Harper, 598 F.3d at 198 (noting that the only notice associated with the
sounds recordings in question appeared “on each of the published phonorecords from which
the audio files were taken” and not the files themselves), and BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430
F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that Cecilia Gonzalez “downloaded data rather than
discs, and the data lacked copyright notice”).
298. D.C. Comics, 912 F.2d at 35 (stating that the “[p]laintiffs’ own evidence also
established that the defendants were unsophisticated merchants”). This, of course, only
refers to those defendants who initially appeared at trial. See supra notes 87–89 and
accompanying text (noting that several defendants defaulted and could not be found to have
innocently infringed).
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an analog era and was never meant to foreclose the innocent infringer
defense automatically. 299 Second, the formation of a duty of inquiry and
the understanding of “access” as general availability effectively eliminate
the innocent infringer provision in a P2P setting, which is a far too dramatic
conclusion not to have been made explicit in the legislation.
A. The Realities of the Digital Age
As technology continues to advance at exponential rates, end-users are
changing the way they receive and manipulate digital information. 300 Since
copyright law is both conceptually abstract and characterized by public
misconception, it makes greater sense either for Congress to modify the
current law or for judges to interpret the existing law with such fundamental
differences in mind. 301
Those who support the broad reading of “access” fail to acknowledge the
differences between copyright infringement in the analog and digital eras.
The Fifth Circuit attempted to justify its position by noting the simultaneous
destruction of the notice requirement and the creation of the notice
exception to innocent infringement found in § 402(d).302 While the Harper
court correctly noted this trade off, 303 focusing only on whether the
copyright holders have provided notice in some form is problematic. Those
supporting the above decisions are essentially “remov[ing] the innocent
infringer defense altogether” in a digital context.304 This position cannot be
supported by the plain text or legislative history of sections 402(d) and
401(d), or the Berne Act, in which the “placement” of notice was discussed
as a specific tool against innocent infringement. 305
An examination of the legislative history of the Berne Act highlights
some problematic aspects of the Gonzalez and Harper decisions.306 At that
time, as in the entire history of innocent infringement, 307 notice was
expressly seen as a protection for mitigation, not as an excuse for its
elimination. 308 In discussing § 402(d)’s non-music corollary, § 401(d),309
299. The differences between the analog and digital era are further demonstrated by the
massive commonality of P2P downloading as a new end-user “norm.” See supra notes 120–
23 and accompanying text.
300. See supra Part II.A.
301. See supra notes 106–15 and accompanying text.
302. See, e.g., Maverick Recording Co. v. Harper, 598 F.3d 193, 199 (5th Cir. 2010)
(providing the historical justification for its reasoning), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 590 (2010).
303. See id.
304. Nesson Brief, supra note 225, at 26.
305. See infra notes 309–11 and accompanying text; see also Nate Anderson, Supreme
Court Told P2P Users Can Be “Innocent Infringers,” ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 20, 2010, 11:03
AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/08/supreme-court-told-p2p-users-canbe-innocent-infringers.ars (“The law was written in an analog era, and it targeted those who
copied tapes or CDs. Such people couldn’t claim not to know about the copyrighted nature
of the works they were copying . . . [b]ut in the digital world, this makes no sense. How
could slapping a copyright notice on a CD alert anyone using a P2P network about
anything?”).
306. See generally S. REP. NO. 100-352 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706.
307. See supra notes 35–37, 62–67 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 208–15 and accompanying text.
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notice was understood to “alert[] users to the fact that copyright is claimed
in the work in question, and . . . prevent many instances of unintentional
infringement.” 310 The placement mandated by § 402(d) was an effective
“alert” because in the analog age, one needed that original, notice-laden
copy in order to infringe in the first place. 311 Therefore, there is no
statutory history to justify the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ destruction of the
innocent infringer defense in the P2P context because copyright notice was
located on the physical CDs, but not on the digital files that Harper and
Gonzalez encountered.
The alternative solutions suggested by Litman, Reese, and Lemley—
while some are obviously more radical than others—all acknowledge that
digital downloading must be addressed in a fundamentally different manner
than the current, outdated statutory scheme. 312 The added complexity
around whether the term “phonorecord” in § 402(d) applies to digital music
files further demonstrates that the provision’s analog nature renders it
inapplicable to digital acts of infringement. 313
Once the circuits’ problematic justification is discounted, one can return
to the actual legislative intent behind the mitigation provision of
§ 504(c)(2): to preserve the innocent infringer defense. 314 A scheme that
examines the defendants’ circumstances to determine their innocence would
fall in line with both the original incarnations of the defense 315 and the
1976 Act that established the modern clause.316 While the long-term goal
should be to revise the Copyright Act to acknowledge the realities of P2P,
the arguments of Justice Alito and Professor Nesson demonstrate that §
402(d) can be interpreted in a manner that requires an actual inquiry into the
defendant’s sophistication and circumstances and does not eliminate
innocent infringer mitigation for digital infringement. 317
B. Why the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ Definition of Access Is Problematic
Given the fundamental differences discussed above, the definition of
“access” as “availability” is conceptually impractical. As Justice Alito
warned, a defendant under that scheme can be found to have had access to a
notice they never could have encountered in a practical manner. 318 The
analysis advocated by critics, and employed by the Middle District of
Georgia in McDowell, provides an example of how a practical inquiry into
access would work. 319 Under this system, if the court found that a
defendant had physical access to a notice-bearing CD jewel case, then
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 43, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3740–41.
See supra notes 112–18 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 241–56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 235–38 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 70–79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.iii.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 269–81 and accompanying text.
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§ 402(d) would bar damage mitigation. 320 Once § 402(d) is no longer seen
as an absolute bar to mitigation, courts will be able to review the infringer’s
circumstances objectively, as Justice Alito advocated, to determine whether
they actually had reason to know their acts constituted infringement.321
The Second Circuit’s opinion in D.C. Comics demonstrates that a court
could find a lack of legal sophistication, along with a virtually
indistinguishable difference between an infringing and legitimate copy—
much like the situations of Whitney Harper and Sarah McDowell—to be
appropriate circumstances for granting mitigation. 322
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ response to the above has been that the
defendant had “access” because they were automatically put on notice, and
therefore had a duty to inquire about the copyrighted status of the files in
question. 323 Such a duty is simply too vague, however, to be practically
implemented. As Professor Nesson warned, the risks of such a system
would present two improper effects on a casual internet user accessing a
perfectly legitimate P2P network:
First, she can assume, incorrectly, that all music is copyrighted.
Alternatively, she can embark on an open-ended quest to verify copyright.
Ultimately, even if no copyright notice is found, it will never be safe to
assume that a work is in the public domain. Under this scheme, innocent
infringement can never be proved. 324

One could imagine many examples where the appropriate CD containing a
song in question is located in a notice-laden jewel case that is hundreds of
miles away. 325 The Fifth and Seventh Circuits, however, would still hold
that this scenario is an appropriate example of “access” to said notice, and
would never look into such factors when determining if mitigation is
warranted. 326
The reason that access in the above sense is inappropriate in the context
of P2P is that the nature of the infringement is radically different.327 When
analog provisions were written, we were still in an age where copyright
infringement was mainly undertaken by professional counterfeiters who
needed to have a physical copy in order to infringe. In that analog world,
§ 402(d) made perfect sense because there would be no scenario where one
could avoid said notice. In the digital age, however, anyone can download
and copy a song with great ease and without ever being presented with
copyright notice anywhere in the timeline.328 Only once the legal
community recognizes this fundamental difference can the concept of
320. See supra notes 289–91 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 292–93 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 294–97 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 191–94 and accompanying text.
324. Nesson Brief, supra note 225, at 27; see also supra note 261 and accompanying text
(noting the complexities inherent with an interpretation of “access” that means that
“someone could have inspected a copy of a work had they inquired”).
325. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
326. See supra Part III.A.
327. See supra Part II.A.
328. See supra notes 103–05 and accompanying text.
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innocent infringement survive. Condoning the views of the Harper and
Maverick courts runs the risk of accepting the effective elimination without
any direction from Congress of one of the few protective provisions in an
already controversial statutory damage regime.
CONCLUSION
In his dissent from denial of certiorari in Harper, Justice Alito noted that
in the “post-‘phonorecord’ age” we need to closely scrutinize copyright
standards articulated long before digital means of infringement were
developed. 329 He cautioned that “not many cases presenting this issue are
likely to reach the Courts of Appeals.”330 The innocent infringement
debate therefore likely will remain stagnant until other circuits analyze the
relevant provisions of the 1976 Act. 331
Nevertheless, it is important to continue to advocate for a change in
copyright law that acknowledges the realities of P2P and the digital age. In
the interim, district judges should apply analog standards with this
fundamental difference in mind and be careful not to discard innocent
infringement.
While perhaps morally questionable to some, P2P
downloading remains a constant phenomenon of modern culture. 332 The
question should not be whether Whitney Harper’s actions were “wrong,”
but rather whether her punishment should be reduced because she did not
have “reason to believe” her acts constituted copyright infringement.333
This distinction is crucial because the most common example of innocent
infringement today—and the kind most deserving of the defense—occurs
when an individual, like Whitney Harper, Sarah McDowell, and countless
others, “knowingly copies from an existing work and reasonably but
erroneously believes, because of copyright law’s complex and often
indeterminate scope, that her copying is permitted, not prohibited, by
copyright law.” 334 Only once others understand that innocent infringement
is not an absolution of liability, but rather a mere reduction to account for
one’s naïveté, can we return to our legislature’s original intent to afford
some protection to innocent infringers.335

329. Harper v. Maverick Recording Co., 131 S. Ct. 590, 591 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. See supra notes 121–23 and accompanying text.
333. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006).
334. Reese, supra note 18, at 183; see also supra notes 205, 213, 269–74 and
accompanying text.
335. See supra Part I.

